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Dossiê Filosofias do Corpo
Incarnated historicity: an essay on Archeology and Imagination
Historicidade encarnada: um ensaio sobre Arqueologia e Imaginação
 Fabricio PontinI, Tatiana Vargas MaiaII
Abstract:In this essay, we will first focus on how important the issue of the body 
and the embodiment is for Foucault’s take on subjectivity and truth, pointing at the 
situatedness of knowledge as an argument about the alienating aspects of embodiment. 
Further, we will contrast Foucault’s bodily intentionality, which shapes the possibilities 
of a narration of self, with Walter Benjamin’s notion of “arcades” and the placement of 
subjectivity as a realm of a narration for the self, which, on its turn, frees subjectivity 
from the materiality of embodiment. Finally, we frame the issue of narration within an 
“aesthetics of embodiment”, pointing the ways in which eroticism and sexuality may 
allow an overcoming of embodied alienation within an open interpretation of Foucault’s 
archeological method. 
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Resumo:Neste ensaio, vamos primeiro focar na importância da questão do corpo e da 
corporificação para a visão de Foucault sobre a subjetividade e a verdade, apontando 
para a localização do conhecimento como um argumento sobre os aspectos alienantes 
da incorporação. Além disso, vamos contrastar a intencionalidade corpórea de Foucault, 
que molda as possibilidades de uma narração do self, com a noção de “paisagens” em 
Walter Benjamin e a colocação da subjetividade como uma narrativa de um self que tenta 
liberar sua subjetividade de uma compreensão materialista do próprio corpo. Finalmente, 
enquadramos a questão da narração dentro de uma “estética da corporificação”, apontando 
as maneiras pelas quais o erotismo e a sexualidade podem permitir uma superação da 
alienação, seguindo uma interpretação aberta do método arqueológico de Foucault.
Palavras-Chave: Corporificação; Alienação; Historicidade; Conhecimento
Introduction
 In this essay, we will first focus on how important the issue of the body and the 
embodiment is for Foucault’s archeological take on subjectivity and truth, attempting to 
point at the situatedness of knowledge, as expressed by Foucault, as an argument about 
the alienating aspects of embodiment, that is, how the presence and feeling of a body in 
fact limits our practices of self and practices of knowledge in distinctive ways, placing 
Foucault’s notion of intentionality firmly as a bodily intentionality which conditions 
every claim of knowledge. Our second part will contrast Foucault’s bodily intentionality, 
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which shapes the possibilities of a narration of self, with Walter Benjamin’s notion 
of “arcades” and the placement of subjectivity as a realm of a narration for the self, 
which, on its turn, frees subjectivity from the materiality of embodiment. In doing 
so, we seek to highlight the tension between Benjamin’s attempt to use narration as a 
tool of emancipation from bodily and intellectual aspects of alienation, and  Foucault’s 
understanding of the situatedness of the body as a clear limit for our narrative 
practices. In our last section, we frame the issue of narration within an “aesthetics 
of embodiment”, pointing at the ways in which eroticism and sexuality may allow 
an overcoming of embodied alienation within an admittedly open interpretation of 
Foucault’s archeological method.
Embodied situatedness: Foucault’s archeology of knowledge as a form of 
bodily alienation
If folly leads each man into a blindness where he is lost, the madman, 
on the contrary, reminds each man of his truth; in a comedy where each 
man deceives the other and dupes himself, the madman is comedy to the 
second degree: the deception of deception; he utters, in his simpleton’s 
language which makes no show of reason, the words of reason that 
release, in the comic, the comedy: he speaks love to lovers, the truth 
of life to the young, the middling reality of things to the proud, to the 
insolent, and to liars.1
 During the archaeological period of his philosophy, Foucault tried to overcome 
the tensions of the structuralist and functionalist debate in France with the notion of 
an archeology of Knowledge. Part of this effort is an analysis of Hegelian historicism, 
specially where time and facts are concerned. Here, Foucault introduces the notion of 
an overcoming of the strict comprehension of History for a narrative undertaken of the 
historical processes. Such archeology of human sciences aims to analyze local discourses 
and to reach some conclusions on the relevance of these discourses and how they 
constitute regimes of discursive truth. This history of truth, a history of the possibility 
of truth, is casted upon an epochè of reference and signification that will allow us to 
overcome the imposition of regimes of truth as the singular possibility of truth.2 Foucault 
seems to follow Heidegger’s account of Kant3 to a certain extent, but he does not buy into 
the metaphysical project of Ontological Difference as he grounds his archeology.
In Foucault, any fundamental claim to knowledge or the possibility of 
knowledge would have to be historicized in the Archaeological method. But what is 
at stake in such a method? Foucault wanted to move away from the more idealistic 
and transcendental aspects of the phenomenological turn, which had swept over 
french though in the early 1960s.  Instead of taking an ontological and structural 
point of view,  Foucault chooses to suggest a duplicity in the pattern of regimes of 
truth and its relations to power, arguing that the discursive practices that suggest 
truth are just that: discursive practices suggesting truth; and that every truth claim 
holds only a linguistic pattern towards truth. In this sense, Foucault will claim that 
claims of objectivity (whether from empiricist or transcendental perspectives) miss 
the point on how knowledge is built. 
 The archeological method seeks to unveil different forms of discursive 
1 FOUCAULT, Madness and Civilization, p. 14
2 DREYFUS et RABINOW apud OLIVEIRA, Tractatus ethico-politicus: genealogia do Ethos moderno, p. 139. 
3 HEIDEGGER, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
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practices, which imply relations between forms of power and conceptions of truth. 
Such discursive practices in the archaeological moment in Foucault’s effort just a way 
to uncover how contingent our conceptions of truth are, and how they are related to 
sovereign impositions of forms-of-life - these practices are, ultimately, seen in the 
body as the locus of practices of the self and of sovereign power. 
 In this sense, Foucault is closer to Walter Benjamin than to Heidegger, and his 
election of Baudelaire as the guide into the narration processes of modernity is a sign of 
how much Foucault relied on Benjamin’s reflections of Modernity. But where the body 
in Benjamin, as we will see, is the body of an individual who wants to dislocate himself 
from alienation through his own authentic affirmation as a unique and creative being, 
in Foucault the body is the core of an erotic limitation - we, as individuals who seek 
to have knowledge of the world, are limited in this knowledge by the situation of our 
bodies, by the way in which our bodies are ordered towards the world. To an extent, this 
embodiment of the process of knowledge turns the body into a vehicle of alienation for 
Foucault - our bodies work against our attempt to have full understanding of the world.
 In that sense, embodiment limits the narrative of the self in Foucault. Our ability 
to give an account of ourselves is shaped by the limits of our bodies, and by the ways in 
which we use our bodies. Foucault introduces the notion of the dispositive as a way to 
show the ambivalent relation of our bodies and the world, and the way that power acts 
throughout this relation. A relation that is bound to a weak notion of immanence.
To speak of a weak notion of immanence is to say that all forms of knowledge 
that are had as actual are actual insofar they arise from certain discursive practices. Had 
Foucault developed a strong notion of immanence, we would find a substantial form of 
knowledge that would pertain to all forms of regional knowledge. Such a condition of 
possibility is not had in the archaeological period of Foucault’s philosophy. However, 
Foucault does develop a weak notion of immanence in the sense that forms of knowledge 
trust the relevance of discursive practices and the individuals that are performing these 
practices. Foucault will defend that certain aesthetic practices imply different regimes 
of desire and power that are more or less relevant to conceptions of truth. 
 Maybe it is still not clear why such implications are understood as a weak-
immanence. The key here is Foucault’s regional use of what we could label an “present 
positioning of history”, or, “history as it appears to ourselves”. Such positioning of 
history, in Foucault, is not had as a stable form that establishes a strong sense of Reality. 
It is rather had as an actual history of a form of knowledge, a determined conception 
of truth. Any attempt to super-impose these local practices and conceptions of truth 
is met with the accusation of sovereignty, of imposition of forms of knowledge against 
practices of the self. Sovereign power, in the form of scientific positivism or grammar, 
will try to “pacify” this multiplicity of claims into a standard form of truth.
 In short, Foucault’s epistemological perspectivism is overall incompatible with 
a strong notion of immanence; it is also incompatible with a notion of transcendence. 
Honneth points this out very well when he writes that for Foucault, every type of 
knowledge “must be seen as being so closely bound up with a given relation of power 
that a transcendent perspective from which these processes could be defined as 
deviations from an ideal situation is no longer possible”4.
 This discussion brings direct consequences for the understanding of embodiment 
in Foucault, because we are dealing with discursive practices and not with regular or 
static structures that hold this process of “constitution” of truth together, Foucault 
manages a way out of the riddle of control and desubjectification. This way out is 
4 HONNETH, Disrespect. The normative foundations of Critical Theory. p. 40     
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characterized by an inversion of the mechanisms of domination – the dispositive. In 
our third section we will get back to this point, but for now it should suffice to say that 
Foucault operates outside the realms of a substantial notion of knowledge and a structural 
definition for the body which both limits the scope in which one can get free of power 
dynamics connected to the situatedness of he body, but also allows us to resignify our 
own situatedness without breaking up with our own current structural realities. 
  “Truth is the death of intention”: Walter Benjamin and the sketches of the 
passages
 In this section we want to focus on a key passage in Benjamin’s late collection 
of aphorisms “The Arcades Project” where Benjamin seems to dispute, at the same time, 
materialistic views of time and truth, and what he claims to be an “essential” point of 
view within phenomenology.  
What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is 
their historical index. (Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for 
phenomenology abstractly through “historicity”). These images are 
to be thought of entirely apart from the categories of the “human 
sciences”, from the so-called habitus, from style and the like. For 
the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a 
particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a 
particular time. And, indeed, this acceding “to legibility” constitutes a 
specific critical point in the movement at their interior. Every present 
day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each 
“now”is the now of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged 
to the bursting point with time. (This point of explosion, and nothing 
else, is the death of the intentio, which thus coincides with the birth of 
authentic historical time, the time of truth). It is not that what is past 
casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what 
is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in 
a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is 
dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the 
past is purely temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is 
dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural. Only dialectical images 
are genuinely historical – that is, not archaic – images. The image that 
is read – which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability – 
bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment 
on which all reading is founded.5   
 This is a long and complex aphorism, but we want to break it down in parts in 
order to clarify the notion of truth, embodiment and authenticity in this passage. To a 
great extent, this aphorisms summarizes Benjamin’s methodology and main arguments 
with Phenomenology. Also, it situates the difference between apparent (archaeological) 
and authentic (truthful) figures Benjamin starts by pointing out the essentialism that 
marks the Heideggerian reading of aletheia, or the appearance of things in veilment and 
unveilment. This essentialism would be marked by the factualization of forms of Being 
by an “abstractalization”, this is the very movement that we find in the paragraph nine 
of Being and Time6, as Dasein is predicated as a necessity-to-be, Being is posited as a 
first necessity of essential relevance – such is the methodological turn that Heidegger 
performs in order to transform the comprehension of the transcendental into a 
5 BENJAMIN,  The Arcades project, p. 462-463. 
6 HEIDEGGER, Being and Time: a Revised Edition of the Stambaugh Translation. 
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comprehension of Being-Itself. This movement of abstractalization, for Benjamin, tries 
to rescue historicity from phenomenology, insofar it turns the question of Being as the 
very destiny of History. History hence becomes a tool through which one unveils Being, 
all the ontic features of appearance are uncovered through the Daseinanalytics.  
The reasons that led Benjamin to distance himself from phenomenology, however, 
are quite different of those that we identified in Foucault, but they are relevant in the 
sense that they allow us to break the issue of the relation of embodiment, narrativity 
and truth into two different perspectives. While Foucault relied on a weak notion of 
immanence without resort to a material feature of reality, Benjamin had both a strong 
notion of immanence and a very sharp notion of materialism.
 Benjamin is very quick to point a sharp distinction between images and essences. 
Essences, he advances, are the appearances that the phenomenologist takes as the 
reduction of reality, the Being that gives the ground for comprehension. The historicist, 
nevertheless, knows that these essences are but an abstract illusion, they must be 
understood as a result of a historical attempt to reduce history to a tool, to a direct and 
acritical description of matters of fact, which are disembodied and dislocated from their 
material and political significances - this alienated notion of history is immediately 
contrasted with an “imagined” and narrative take on history.
Such narrative take is what we could describe as an “embodied historicity”, such 
narrative  allow images of the past to be legible as it were (es gibt), there is a now-
point (jeztpunkt) where the images reveal the possibility of a recognition of a point past. 
Truth is charged in the present, it is revealed in an immanation, in a recognition - in 
bodies that are immediately placed in relation and recognize their respective historical 
placement. 
There is no intentionality in this explosion, present and past become authentic 
in the moment of this recognition, as an immediate appearance of the Real - as a 
breakdown of an order of alienated beings. This is what is meant by the relation of 
what-has-been to the now-point. It is important to stress here the dual-notion of time 
that is at play for Benjamin. On one hand, we have the chronological time – the time of 
physics, that is given as a succession of now-points, the “train” of history. On the other 
hand, we have authentic time, this authentic time is given in the form of a revelation, 
of a pure-appearance of something as a standstill reality that has-come-to-pass. There 
is, however, a dialectical relation here, insofar we are situated in chronological time 
but we are hit by authentic reality in a different level . This dialectical relation of the 
now-point as both chronological (material) and  real (truthful) is made possible by a 
dialectical movement of historicity. Without this movement, we are either left with 
a purely immanent understanding of history that tries to uncover an abstract reality 
out of essences, or with a brute archaism that suggests the possibility of narrating the 
past as it really were, instead as how it has-come-to-pass.  It is important to note that 
embodiment plays a central role in this plays of immanence in Benjamin: intentionality 
keeps the immanence at play at the same time it blocks the emergence of truth. 
 If this seems quite exoteric, it is because it is meant to be. For Benjamin, it is at 
this point that we reach the critical moment, or, in his own words, the perilous critical 
moment. But why is it perilous? It is perilous insofar we risk throwing ourselves into 
objectivism and the attempt of reproduction of the material reality of history in the 
present. Benjamin is quick to point that these pictorial forms of authentic forms are 
not in themselves material, they are instead narrated figuratively in the now-point, as 
we transform archaic images into historical images through dialectical relation. The 
critical moment, then, is this transformation, where imagination, rather than intuition, 
is the tool used to make it possible for authentic historical narration to be-come. 
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 But then, isn’t Benjamin suggesting that history is a figment of imagination? 
Very much like a work of fiction? It seems to us that the answer to this question 
must be negative. History is not a work of fiction, it is not just our perception of the 
past as it seems to be.  Rather, what Benjamin calls authentic history is a revelation 
of the placement of the body in relation to time, which is narrated by an individual 
who disclocates herself, through a narrative of herself. Once again, it is necessary to 
stress that time is given immanently at the same time that is lived materially, and in 
the synchrony of these forms of givenness of time we have the jeztpunkt where archaic 
forms and narrative images are coincidental, and thus authentic.  Hence the remark 
that truth is the death of intention, it is the death of intention because the way we proxy 
truth is not given in an intentional relationship between subject and object, but by 
the removal of subjectivity from a mere relation to objects. Communicative forms that 
express something about the past and claim the reality of the past, must then express 
this constellation, in the form of a memory that reconciles the past with the present.
 In the Origin of the German Tragic Drama,  Benjamin writes:
The object of knowledge, determined as it is by the intention inherent 
in the concept, is not truth. Truth is an intentionless state of being, 
made up of ideas. The proper approach to it is not therefore one of 
intention and knowledge, but rather a total immersion and absorption 
in it. Truth is the death of intention.7
 Again, this seems to suggest the ontological (hence, not imaginary) relevance of 
Truth as “an intentionless state of being”, even though this same Truth is narrative, it is 
“made up of ideas”. Benjamin seems to be suggesting that one should take an aesthetic 
perspective towards truth and knowledge, but unlike Foucault, he is not suggesting 
that these practices posit games-of-knowledge that create and invent Truth. Rather, 
by seeking the aesthetic practice of oneself as a Flaneur, as one who wanders around 
the city watching the passages and discovering history one is rather engaging in a 
immersion in the Reality of experience (and the images presented to us in-experience) 
and that which is revealed by experience in the world. 
 Imagination and the construction of Reason: Foucault’s dialectical deficit
 In 1968, Foucault was being questioned on his works on Archeology by the 
Epistemological Circle, specially on the grounds of obscurantism and relativism. Such 
criticism was met with a direct response from Foucault in On the Archeology of Sciences, 
where he looked back on the project of The Archeology of Knowledge and its discursive 
practices of truth. It seems that a particular passage in that article summarizes what is 
at stake both in The Order of Things and in Madness and Civilization:
These discursive sets should not be seen as a rhapsody of false 
knowledges, archaic themes and irrational figures which the sciences, in 
their sovereignty, definitively thrust aside into the night of a prehistory. 
Nor should they be imagined as the outline of future sciences that are 
still confusedly wrapped around their futures, vegetating for a time 
in the half sleep of silent germination. Finally, they should not be 
conceived as the only epistemological system to which those supposedly 
false, quasi- or pseudo-science, the human sciences, are susceptible. To 
analyze discursive formations, positivities and the knowledge which 
corresponds to them is not to assign forms of scientifically but, rather, 
7 BENJAMIN, The Origin of German Tragic Drama. p. 36.
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to run through a field of historical determination which must account 
for the appearance, retention, transformation, and, in the last analysis, 
the erasure of discourses, some of which are still recognized today as 
scientific, some of which have lost that status, some have never pretended 
to acquire it, and finally, others have never attempted to acquire it. In 
a word, knowledge is not science in the successive displacement of its 
internal structures; it is the field of its actual history.8
 This is one of the few places in Foucault’s works that we are  able to find a direct 
definition of what knowledge is and how it is posited as a available form. The first thing 
we know about knowledge in the Archaeological method, then, is that it is discursive. 
The author is concerned with the discursive practices that seek to establish a certain 
knowledge as truth. However, it is important to stay attentive to the multiplicity of 
knowledge in Foucault. Foucault quickly informs us that sciences have a claim of 
sovereignty on what is knowledge. Those who are familiar with Foucault will clearly 
identify an imposition in this claim, since the act of sovereignty is an imposition of 
knowledge from the outside – as the form of rationality that imposes the discourse on 
madness, or the Order of Resemblances that imposes relation of things and ideas-of-
things as neccessary. Narration is not such practice, and it is also not some future or 
teleological destiny that we are currently seeking to unveil. The narration of discursive 
practices, for Foucault, takes on hold of the discursive practices themselves, and it 
speaks truth to the field of the actual history of this practices, as opposed to the relation 
of this practices to some kind of strong reference-point. The condition of possibility 
of knowledge is not some transcendental Being, or a dialectical relation of past and 
present points given in revelation. It is rather knowledge itself, “ the field of its actual 
history”. Knowledge is then singular in its relation to itself, but it is multiple in its 
narrative relevances. It is also invented as a narrative practice, it is a field of illimitable 
possibilities of truth and knowledge that are subsequently posited from different 
conception of truth and narration. 
 When we speak of a weak notion of immanence in Foucault, we are speaking 
of  the main point at view: The forms of knowledge that are had as actual, are actual 
insofar they arise from certain discursive practices. Had Foucault developed a strong 
notion of immanence we would find a substantial form of knowledge that would 
pertain all forms of regional knowledge. Such condition of possibility is not had in 
the archaeological period of Foucault’s philosophy. However, Foucault does develop a 
weak notion of immanence in the sense that forms of knowledge trust the relevance 
of discursive practices and individuals that are performing these practices. If Deleuze 
linked the reality of desire as relevant in all acts of knowledge, Foucault will see how 
certain aesthetics imply different regimes of desire and power that are more or less 
relevant to conceptions of truth. 
 Maybe it is still not clear why such implications are understood as a weak 
immanence. The key here is Foucault regional use of actual positing of history. History, 
in Foucault, is not had as a stable form that establishes a strong sense of Reality. It is 
rather had as a actual history of one form of knowledge, one determined conception of 
truth, which appears in relation to a situated body.
 Foucault follows Benjamin in the imagined practices that posit ourselves in 
the world as a knowing-subject. The point of departure is the identification of stable 
forms that necessitate a narration to bare witness to facts as they have come to pass. 
Archeology, in Foucault, only bares witness to itself, to a knowing-subject that is able 
8 FOUCAULT, Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Volume 2, Aesthetics, p.326.
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to posit only his own history and narrations, without being able to increase the scope 
of his claims outside his own discourse or reality. Better yet, any attempt to super-
impose these local practices and conceptions of truth is met with the accusation of 
sovereignty, of imposition of forms of knowledge against practices of the self. 
 In short, Foucault’s epistemological perspectivism is overall incompatible with 
a strong notion of immanence, it is also incompatible with a notion of transcendence. 
Honneth points it very well:
[a]ccording to Foucault every type of knowledge must be seen as being 
so closely bound up with a given relation of power that a transcendent 
perspective from which these processes could be defined as deviations 
from an ideal situation is no longer possible. 9
 The lack of both a transcendental and immanent notion of ground in this 
moment of Foucault’s work suggests that the movement towards genealogy is not only 
a consequence of a change of concern, but a recognition that Archeology was not able 
to deal with relevant aspects of knowledge that would be expressed non-discursively 
or to describe aesthetics of the self that we would be able to identify as unacceptable 
without resorting to imposition from the outside. 
Language/Power/Self
I would wonder if the act hadn’t been purely personal, aimed against 
Minette Swift as an individual, and not “racist”. Yet how swiftly and 
crudely the personal becomes the racial! As if, beneath ordinary hatred, 
there is a deeper, more virulent and deadly racial hatred to be tapped. 
As the nineteenth-century British looked upon the “Hottentot Venus” (a 
naively trusting young South African woman who had cooperated with 
her exploiters, I’d discovered) as a crude sexual spectacle, a brute and not 
human being to be ogled, displayed in a carnival, eventually dissected for 
“scientific” purposes. It was sickening, such cruelty. Yet exhilarating to 
know for always there is power in knowledge. 10
As I explored her body, feeling my way among the braces and straps of 
her underwear, the unfamiliar planes of her hips and legs steered me into 
unique culs-de-sac, strange declensions of skin and musculature. Each of 
her deformities became a potent metaphor for the excitements of a new 
violence. Her body, with its angular contours, its unexpected junctions 
of mucous membrane and hairline, detrusor muscle and erectile tissue, 
was a ripening anthology of perverse possibilities. As I sat with her by 
the airport fence in her darkened car, her white breast in my hand lit by 
the ascending airlines, the shape and tenderness of her nipple seemed to 
rape my fingers. Our sexual acts were exploratory ordeals.11
 Our take on Foucault’s archeology in this article has been critical and skeptical, 
and our contentions might not have done justice to the repercussion of Foucault’s 
work in the philosophical and cultural scenario post-1967. It is a rather an easy task to 
point at Foucault’s epic attempt to reconstruct imagination as a groundless practice of 
selfhood as a failure, specially after authors like Habermas and Honneth12 were able to 
take on some of the insights of the Foucaultian analysis and re-integrate them in the 
tradition of transcendental philosophy.  
9 HONNETH, Disrespect. The normative foundations of Critical Theory, p. 40
10 OATES, Black Girl/White Girl: A Novel, p. 128.
11 BALLARD, Crash: A novel, p. 175-176.
12 KELLY, Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. MIT Press, 1994.
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 However, the relation between power and language and its implications for 
the construction of the self as developed in the Archaeological movement in Foucault 
cannot be underestimated. Perhaps the most important contribution of this period of 
Foucault’s archeology is not the text of the Order of Things or the insights of Madness 
and Civilization, but the commanding nature that those works acquired to a generation 
of philosophers and writers who on their turn were able to transform and ironically 
historicize Archeology as a part of a project of knowledge, as part of that constellation 
that Benjamin was drawing on his way from Berlin to Port-Bou.
 Genealogy appears in this context, as modernity is recast in Foucault as not 
a question of sovereignty but of emancipation, of the liberation of the forms of life 
from their mimetic necessities, the liberation of bodies and sexuality of its biological 
boundaries and finally the emergence of an ethical expression of oneself that is had 
both aesthetically and politically. 
 In the project of the Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault points at a rejoinder 
of the politics and the aesthetics of the body:
That bios, that life – by which I mean the way in which the world 
immediately appears to us in the course of our existence – is a test 
should be understood in two senses. Test in the sense of experience, 
that is to say the world is recognized as being that through which we 
experience ourselves, through which we know ourselves, discover 
ourselves and reveal ourselves to ourselves. And then, test in the sense 
that this world, this bios, is also an exercise, that is to way that on the 
basis of which, through which, in spite of or thanks to which we form 
ourselves, advance towards an aim or salvation, or head towards our 
own perfection. (…). The challenge is this: How can what is give as the 
object of knowledge (savoir) connected to the mastery of tekhné, at the 
same time be the site where the truth of the subject we are appears, or 
is experience and fulfilled with difficulty?  How can the world which 
is given as the object of (connoissance) and at the same time the place 
of the subject’s “self”as the ethical subject of truth appears and is 
experienced?  If this really is the problem of Western philosophy – how 
can the world be the object of knowledge (connaissance) and at the 
same time the place of the subject’s test; how can there by a subject of 
knowledge (connoissance) which takes the world as object through a 
tekhné, and a subject of self-experience which takes this same world, 
but in the radically different form of the place of its test? – if this 
really is the challenge of Western philosophy, you will see why The 
Phenomenology of Spirit is the summit of this philosophy. 13 
 At this stage of his work, Foucault understands “biopower” as a way by which 
capitalist society invests in this form of power as something that constitutes the social body. 
At first, Foucault tries to show how the history of biopolitics is tied with the history of 
capitalism; with the emergence of cities, the emergence of health policies. The leading clue 
here is the emergence of these policies within the German state, better yet, as a unifying 
force for the German state. Foucault tries to point out that the development of capitalism 
in Germany happens because the German state lacks the tools that England and France 
had at hand to develop a state. Where England and France could count on strong armies 
and strong economies, Germany had to count on a different aspect: the medical. 
But why is this noteworthy? It is noteworthy in the sense that it creates a different 
form of expression for sovereign power. The focus, for Foucault, is not in the change of 
mode of production – though this is important – but in the change of strategy in order to 
13 FOUCAULT, The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France. 1981-1982, p. 486-487.
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enable governance. This strategy of power is identified in Foucault as a first “phase” of 
biopolitics, that is, medicine of state. This is peculiar to the development of capitalism 
as it relates to the modern, Westphalian, State and the Westphalian mode of sovereignty. 
For Foucault, this mode of governance is the most important historical feature for our 
understanding of the period, as the Staatswissenschaft are perfected in the Prussian state as 
a meticulous control of the general health of the population. 
Wherein previous models of sovereignty were concerned with individual bodies – 
domesticated by the army, controlled by the police, and punished in the prison – now we 
have the emergence of the sovereignty as the manager of a population, a group of individuals 
under a same rubric. In Germany, the first individual to be “normatized” is the doctor – 
the State establishes general norms, criteria, to allow the construction of medical schools, 
and the State issues the final stamp that permits one to practice medicine legally. It is also 
the State that will verify the means and conditions that qualify an epidemic and how to 
deal with one – but in order to identify the “sick”, first the State will need a model for the 
normal. This model was the physician, so now we had a concept of sick and a concept of 
health, both under control of a sovereign structure. Surely, Foucault is aware of the necessity 
of such a move in a Europe that still suffered the consequences of the plague; but we also 
need to be aware that this move also plays a part in the transformation of the government. 
How exactly does it change the role of the government? The movement into 
biopolitics will dislocate the “place” of the sovereign in the sense that the power over 
the subject is no longer located in establishing a “docile” body by external force, but by 
domesticating life by defining the stances in which life is worthy of protection and how it 
is worthy of protection. There is a sovereign imposition of modes of living and normative 
differences for different “profiles”. Please note that Biopolitics is not only negative, it grants 
an important set of rights, such as social security, public healthcare, and public hospitals, 
but Foucault is quick to point out that the right to social security, public healthcare, 
and public hospitals (just to give some examples) is dependent on whether or not one is 
contemplated as having rights. Racial and social identity are not a matter of an individual 
making sense of his own history, but a matter of external imposition of a profile that will 
grant you more or less protection – or, in some cases, no protection whatsoever. 
This strategic imposition of a mode of living was thought so that individuals would 
pursue occupations that do not serve their own interests, but the interest of society. The 
dislocation of the population from farms and into industrial areas, in the first moments of 
Capitalism, denotes this biopolitic. The State first develops the science that will allow for 
the identification of a profile, and later it uses this profile in order to create a workforce. 
And note that Foucault doesn’t express any moral judgment about this movement – at this 
moment, biopolitics is neither negative nor positive. Rather, he seems to want to point out 
how this creation of a workforce, and the consequential urbanization of the modern space, 
are dependent on the birth of social medicine. Or, if you prefer, on the birth of biopolitics.
Because we are dealing with discursive practices and not with regular or static 
structures that hold this process of “constitution” of truth together, Foucault finally 
manages a way out of the riddle of control and desubjectification that does not require, as 
it did in Benjamin’s substantive and immanent reading, a replacement of the body outside 
of the capitalist and liberal order. Foucault sees a potential way out in an inversion of the 
mechanisms of domination – the dispositive.
 But how is that possible? This is possible because bodies that are explored by 
sovereign power in order to constitute a repressive regime of truth can be turned upside 
down as mechanisms of resistance. In this sense, Foucault does not accept the idea of a 
static structure for emotions – or for knowledge in general, for that matter – turning the 
project of enlightenment into a project of resignification of practices. 
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 In the last volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault spends a long time 
describing the practices of domination and submission in sadomasochism. Regardless of 
what one might think of Foucault’s choice of example and lifestyle, he is trying to point out 
the redefinition of dispositifs of punishment into dispositifs of pleasure. The care of the 
self appears as an antidote to the technologies of power. The shame of being “subjected” 
or “reduced” is now reconstituted as a form of re-approaching the limits of one’s own 
body as something to be celebrated. This is the emergence of the technologies of the self 
as a “positive” side of biopolitics, the care for one’s own body, one’s own identity and 
the exploration of one’s relationship with others as something that does not need to be 
mediated by the pre-defined conceptions established – grammatically and constitutionally 
– by a sovereign power. Freedom, in Foucault, will be embracing the limits of one’s own self 
while at the same time emancipating the construction of one’s own identity and expression 
from the restrains of an external power.
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